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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEN ARNOVITZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JOHN LEWIS TELLA,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12491

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STA'fEl\IENT

O~_,

KIND OF CASE

Appellant commenced this action seeking to recover
for property damage and personal injuries suffered in
an automobile collision involving Appellant and Respondent, and Respondent counterclaimed for damages
to his automobile.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The case was tried below to the Court sitting without a jury. The Court rendered judgment in favor of the
1

Respondent and against the Appellant for no cause of
action on Appellant's Complaint, and in favor of Respondent and against Appellant on Respondent's Counterclaim in the sum of $500.00 with interest at 6 percent
from June 8, 1970, until date of judgment, and thereafter at 8 percent per annum until satisfied, plus costs of
$18.10.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Court's judgment in its entirity.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with Appellant as to the time
and place of the collision as outlined in Appellant's Brief,
and agrees that two separate and distinct collisions occurred involving the two parties.
Respondent disagrees with Appellant's statements
as to the relative severity of the two collisions and the
amount of damages directly attributable to each. It is
Respondent's view of the facts, apparently accepted by
the lower Court, that the first collision, in which Appellant's vehicle struck Respondent's vehicle from the rear,
was sufficiently severe to break the carburetor control
mechanism governing the acceleration of Respondent's
vehicle, and tear the front seat of Respondent's vehicle
2

from the floorboard. Either by the jolt of the collision
itself, or by the involuntary movement of Respondent as
he was thrust backwards by the jolt and the breaking of
the seat, the automatic transmission shift leaver was
forced into reverse position. This, along with the fact
that Respondent's vevhicle was now racing "wide open,"
resulted in the second collision, in which Respondent's
vehicle backed into Appellant's vehicle. (Tr. 83, 84, and
85)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE THERE IS A CONFLICT IN
THE EVIDENCE, THE REVIEWING COURT
l\iUST VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PREVAILING PARTY.
Appellant's Points II, III, IV, and Vall go to the
sufficiency of the evidence. It is not seriously disputed
that the first collision was caused by Appellant's vehicle running into the rear of Respondent's vehicle. Respondent testified that this initial impact broke the seat
of his vehicle loose from the floor and forced the vehicle's
gear shift leaver into the reverse position, which caused
the second impact. (Tr. 83) Respondent also testified
that he had no intention of backing his vehicle into that
of Appellant, and no intention whatsoever of harming
Appellant. (Tr. 87)
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Respondent's version was supported by the testimony of Officer Mower, the investigating officer who
inspected the Respondent's vehicle at the scene and testified that the front seat was loose from the floor and that
the vehicle's accelerator "was stuck wide open." ( 'l'r.
101)

Appellant's witnesses testified that Respondent
backed rapidly (Tr. 8, 23, and 37), that his engine was
racing (Tr. 10, 29, and 48), and that the two collisions
were almost simultaneous (Tr. 40, 52, and 53). Such
testimony is supportive of Respondent's version of the
cause of the second collision, which certainly seems more
reasonable than Appellant's allegations that the Respondent deliberately and maliciously backed his vehicle at a rapid rate of speed into Appellant's vehicle,
thus exposing himself to serious injury.
In short, there is at best a conflict in the evidence.
The Appellant asks the Court to believe his version of
the facts rather than Respondent's version, which the
Court is not obligated to do.
Prior Utah cases make it clear that the reviewing
Court must review the evidence and whatever reasonable inferences can be drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, and not in the light
most favorable to the Appellant as Appellant asks. Pollick vs. J. C. Penny, 24 Utah 2nd 405, 473 P 2nd 394
(1970); Brigham vs. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah
2nd 292, 470 P 2nd 393 ( 1970); Howe vs. Jackson, 18
Utah 2nd 269, 421 P 2nd 159 (1966).
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The same general rule would also apply regarding
the amount of damages awarded by the Court which
Appellant claims was an erroneous award. Respondent
testified that his vehicle was worth $600.00 to $650.00,
and that he had priced similar vehicles on the open market and found that they were selling for $450.00 to
$700.00 (Tr. 88). Respondent also introduced into evidence two editions of a local newspaper, dated near the
time of the collision, each containing therein a classified
advertisement for a vehicle of the same model and year.
The advertised prices of these vehicles were $400.00 and
$700.00 (Tr. 88 and 89). Respondent also testified that
the car was "totaled out." (Tr. 89).
There was no testimony introduced rebutting the
value of the car. Under these circumstances, where the
Court found that the car was "totaled" it was obligated
to accept Respondent's evidence as to the value, as there
was no other evidence before it.
POINT II
A JUDG~IENT SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED ON APPEAL UNLESS THERE IS
ERROR OF SUCH SUBSTANTIAL NATURE
THAT THERE IS LIKELIHOOD THAT THE
RESULT WOULD HA VE BEEN DIFFERENT
IN ITS ABSENCE.
Respondent admits that the weight of authority in
this jurisdiction apparently allows witnesses to testify
concerning the visible emotions and demeanor of others
5

in certain instances as claimed by Appellant in Point I
of his Brief on appeal. Respondent does not believe that
the Court erred in excluding the testimony it did in this
case, and contends that even if it were error, it was not
substantial or prejudicial and therefore was not reversible error.
Appellant cited Fritz vs. Western Union Telegraph
Company, 25 Utah 263, 71 P 209 (1903), and In Re
Miller's Estate, 36 Utah 228, 102 P 996 (1909) to support his allegation that reversible error was committed.
It should be noted that in both of these cases, the witness
was well acquainted with the person his testimony concerned, and the foundation laid in both cases showed that
the witness was qualified to make such a judgment based
upon his familiarity with the individual and his opportunity to observe such emotion. The law in Utah is to
the effect that a trial judge has a reasonable right of
discretion as to how far afield examination of witnesses
may be pursued, and his rulings should not be disturbed
unless it clearly appears that he was in error in his judgment or that he abused his discretion. In Re Baxter's
Estate, 16 Utah 2nd 284, 399 P 2nd 422, 17 ALR 3rd
700 (1965).
In the case at hand, the two witnesses questioned as
to the emotion exhibited by Respondent were apparent
strangers to him, and had apparently never seen him before. Their observations were made while riding in and
driving an automobile (Tr. 7 and 23) located across the
intersection from Respondent who was also in an auto-
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mobile. The observation of each lasted only a few seconds, as both admitted they did not see the first collision
(Tr. 18 and Tr. 34 lines 25 through 27), and both witnesses were somewhat unsure of just what type of emotion Respondent exhibited.
Mr. Jensen testified that Respondent "appeared to
be quite disturbed and angry about something," and that
"he had-well, he looked like he was disturbed." (Tr. 7)
A "disturbed" look is not at all out of harmony with Respondent's testimony. Mr. Jensen testified as follows
(Tr. 33 and 34)
Q You don't know~· Did he have his arm up on
the back of the seat lo king over his left shoulder?
Or did he just have his head turned?

A Well, I don't know.

Q You don't know? You didn't observe that?

Could you clearly see his face?

A No.
Q You couldn't clearly see his face?
A I don't remember, except thatQ Well, you answered my question. You don't
remember.
A I guess.
THE COURT: Except that maybe she is not
saying that. Finish your answer, please.
THE \VITNESS: \Vell, I saw his face.
Q (By ~Ir. :Moffat) Could you clearly see his
face?
A I think so.
7

Q And this was with him looking over the left
shoulder and you at the intersection of Second
South?
A Uh huh.
Q Before you made the turn?
A Uh huh.
Appellant's other witness testified that Respondent
looked over his right shoulder (Tr. 37), which would indicate that his head was turned away from the Jensen
vehicle.
Without more of a foundation, the Court was correct in not allowing the witnesses to testify as to the emotional state of Respondent. The Court did allow the witnesses to testify as to what they observed (Tr. 11 and
29), which under the circumstances, was all that the witnesses could reliably testify to.
Our case would seem to be nearer the situation in
Weaver vs. State, l Ala App 48, 55 So. 956 ( 1911), than
the cases cited by the Appellant. In the Weaver case, the
Court said
The question asked the witness Levi, "Was the
deceased at the time quarrelsome," or "in a quarrelsome mood during the seven minutes immediately preceding the shooting?" sought to elicit the
opinion of the witness, and the facts from which
the jury, as was its province, and not that of the
witness, draw such a conclusion, and the State's
objections to such questions were properly sustained.
In denying an application for the rehearing of this case
in 2 Ala App 98, 56 So. 749 (1911) it was said
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The questions in point here call for more than a
mere shorthand rendering of facts, or such an
opinion as witness may give under the recognized
exceptions to the general rule against the permissibility of opinion evidence; these questions
call for the mental status, the mood in which the
deceased was, extending over a period of seven
minute's time. How he evidenced such a quarrelsome mood during that length of time was certainly susceptible of narration.
It should be pointed out that the instant case was
tried before the Court sitting without a jury, whereas,
both cases cited by Appellant in support of the claimed
error, were tried before a jury. The judge's rulings on
evidence are not as critical in a trial to a Court sitting
without a jury, since a trial judge will include in his consideration of the issues his knowledge as to the competency, materiality and effect of the evidence. In Re
Baxter's Estate, supra; Sweeny vs. Happy Valley, Inc.,
18 Utah 2nd 113, 417P2nd126 (1966).

Even should the Court determine that error was
committed, it is Respondent's position that it was not reversible error in this case. The record shows that the
Court was advised that the witnesses believed Respondent was angry, so that issue was before the Court. The
following testimony was made without objection. (Tr. 7)
A ... And what attracted my attention was Mr.
Tella, or the one-the driver-the defendant was
looking over his shoulder at the car behind him
and leaning back over his seat looking back atbehind him, and I just couldn't figure what he
was looking for. But I watched him for a minute,
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and all at once I noticed that he-well, he appeared to be quite disturbed and angry about
something. I don't know.

Q Proceed with your testimony.
A He had-well, he looked like he was disturbed.
Therefore, the testimony Appellant later tried to
elicit from the witnesses would only be cumulative, and
its exclusion would not be so prejudicial as to be reversible. Also, the vantage point of the witnesses' observation
and their uncertainty as to what they saw, as explained
above, would limit the value of their testimony on this
point. Prior Utah cases make it clear that the reversal of
a judgment is justified only when there is some error of
such substantial nature that there is likelihood that the
result would have been different in its absence. Eager vs.
'Villis, 17 Utah 2nd 314, 410 P 2nd 1003 ( 1966); In Re
Baxter's Estate, supra. Rule 5 of the Rules of Eivdence
as adopted by this Court states the rule as follows
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor
shall the judgment or decision based thereon be
reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of
evidence unless (a) it appears of record that the
proponent of the evidence either made known the
substance of the evidence in a form and by a
method approved by the judge, or indicated the
substance of the expected evidence by questions
indicating the desired answers, and (b) the Court
which passes upon the effect of the error or errors
is of the opinion that the excluded evidence would
probably have had a substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict or finding.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent maiutains that the trial court was correct in its ruling because:
I. There is at least a conflict of the evidence as to

the negligence and contributory negligence of the parties
involved, and there is substantial evidence supporting
the Findings of Fact of the trial court. This Court must
view the evidence in light most favorable to Respondent's
position.
2. The Court rightfully exercised its discretion in

excluding certain testimony of Appellant's witnesses,
which action was not error. Even if error were committed, it was not so prejudicial or substantial as to be
reversible error where the case was tried by the judge
without a jury, where the testimony would have been
cumulative had it been introduced, and where the circumstances were such that any conclusions the witnesses
might have reached regarding Respondent's emotional
state would have been extremely speculative.
'VHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully prays
that the action of the trial court be affirmed.
J\IIOFFAT, 'VELLING, TAYLOR
and PAULSEN

Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys for Respondent
9th Floor Tribune Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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